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22 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM :

VIA :

SUBJECT :

REFERENCE :

[C], C/ISS/PICG
[C] DC/SE/CI/R
[C/SE/OSG]
File Review - Edgars LAIPENIEKS
[C/ISS/PICG] Memorandum on LAIPENIEKS
dated 13 October 1976

1. I have reviewed the first four volumes of LAIPENIEKS' 201, examining each individual document from the point of view of releasability, and I have compiled a rough index to each volume, citing my opinion on each document. When it is my opinion that a particular item can be released in sterilized form, I have made a xerox copy and attached it to the pertinent index, indicating how I think the item should be sterilized. I have not reviewed volume five of the 201, since it contains only material dating from the initial press play and LAIPENIEKS' ensuing FOIA request. While this volume contains some summaries of material in the preceding volumes, it does not contain any new information concerning [SE Division]'s operational involvement with LAIPENIEKS. Since these summaries do not contain any new information, and since they were engendered only because of LAIPENIEKS' FOIA request, in my opinion they should not be released.

2. You will note a few black and red asterisks along the lefthand column of the indexes. A black asterisk indicates that the item must be referred to some other office or agency to determine releasability. A red asterisk denotes those items which may prove troublesome

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for one reason or another if released, and which therefore should be given a thorough review before a final decision is made.

3. In addition to reviewing LAIPENIEKS' own 201, I have also reviewed the following files:

CI/OA file on LAIPENIEKS

Indexes for these volumes are attached. I have NOT reviewed the Office of Security file in any depth, although I did look it over in office. According to a memorandum dated 9 July 1975 (a copy is in the LAIPENIEKS 201), Security has already undertaken such a review. However, that memorandum does not indicate, to me at least, that they have looked at one particularly vital document - the Fort Holabird derogatory trace which is in LAIPENIEKS' CI/OA file. This will have to be done if it hasn't been done already.

4. In conducting this review, I have kept the following points in mind:

a. Invasion of privacy - I have deleted the names of almost everyone mentioned in connection with LAIPENIEKS, simply so that CIA won't be responsible for any "guilt by association" if any of this material ends up in the press. I have left in the names of LAIPENIEKS' immediate family, plus those of a few individuals whose acquaintance was overt and on the professional, not personal level. I have also left in the names of the Soviet Latvians whose names have appeared in the press in connection with LAIPENIEKS and his activities.

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b. [While I have, of necessity, left in the name of LAIPENIEKS' son Juris, [

c. I have tried to eliminate any indication of what LAIPENIEKS did for us [at the Stanford (Palo Alto) track meet in the summer of 1962, [

[partly because of "sources and methods" considerations, and partly because we don't really know what [[has told the KGB, and what impact any revelations could have for him.]

d. On the other hand, I have left in the material concerning KALNINS. We know from the Riga radio interview that he reported LAIPENIEKS' approach rather fully; I don't think what's in the LAIPENIEKS file could hurt him.

e. I have denied release of all the material pertaining to our contacts with LAIPENIEKS in Mexico City in 1967 and 1968. "Sources and methods" applies, I believe, but the main point is that Philip Agee saw some of this material, either at Headquarters or in Mexico City. If any of it is released and he gets access to it it may jog his memory concerning LAIPENIEKS, and possibly concerning other operations.

5. If the material in LAIPENIEKS' file is released to him in the form I have indicated, it is going to look rather strange to him, since I have sterilized letters he sent to us, and letters we sent to him, via the open mail. However, it should be clear to him, if not to anyone else, that the deleted material pertained to his involvement with [[plus his biographic reporting on Latvians who he thought might be of interest to CIA. None of the deleted material would help or hurt him with I&NS in any way that I can see.

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6. In case it matters, LAIPENIEKS signed a Secrecy Agreement back in July 1962. A copy of it is in volume one of his 201.

7. At the same time that I forward this memorandum with its attached indexes, I intend to return LAIPENIEKS' CI/OA file to the CI Staff, and his 201 plus those of [] and [] to IP/Files. I realize I may not have heard the last of LAIPENIEKS but I am going on leave shortly and I don't want to be charged with these files while I am gone.

Attachments

Seven rough indexes on yellow paper with suggested sterilization of selected documents

Distribution:

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